Introduction
The needs to handle the dynamic preferences in the frameworks of the non-monotonic reasoning are remarkably wellrecognized recently.
In the commonsense reasoning, preferences among involved conicting rules are metalevel information and its assessment plays a crucial role in the reasoning. However, in the conventional frameworks of non-monotonic reasoning such as prioritized circumscription [8] , the preference information itself cannot be expressed in the logical language within their frameworks.
For example, in prioritized circumscription, information about \what should be the minimized predicates, their priorities and variable predicates?", is pre-specied by the user. Especially, priorities are determined in an external manner such as the metalevel reasoning of a human being who takes into account various kinds of preferences in each particular application.
The following legal reasoning example [6] illustrates that the dynamic preferences are quite natural in human commonsense reasoning. :fin0statement:
Now the question is whether the UCC or the SMA takes precedence in this case, that is, in other words: whether ab1 or ab2 has the higher priority for minimization in circumscription. There are two known legal principles for resolving conicts of this kind. The principle of Lex Posterior gives precedence newer laws. In our case, UCC is newer than the SMA. On the other hand, the principle of Lex Superior gives precedence to laws supported by the higher authority. In our case the SMA has higher authority since it is federal law. When formalizing this example by using circumscription, rstly, a human being may do the meta-reasoning from M and obtains the following result:
M`SMA UCC; M`U CC SMA:
Therefore, he (she) decides that there is no precedence between SMA and UCC, that is, there is no priorities between ab1 and ab2, which leads to parallel circumscription as follows: Circum( 8 A; ab1; ab2; perfected); where neither perfected nor :perfected is proved. Now, assume the following information is added to M: LP (SMA; UCC) LS(UCC; SMA): Since UCC SMA and SM A U CC are derived by LS(UCC; SMA) and LP (SMA; UCC) respectively, he (she) decides that UCC SMA is preferable to SMA UCC, and the priority of ab2 should be assigned higher than ab1, which leads to prioritized circumscription as follows: Circum( 8 A; ab2 > ab1; perf ected) j = :perfected
The aim of our research is to integrate consistently such a human metalevel reasoning about dynamic preferences and the object-level non-monotonic reasoning formalized by circumscription. As is shown in this example, the non-monotonic reasoning which can treat dynamic preferences correctly is inevitably required in case of applying three well-known general principles Lex Superior, Lex Specialis and Lex Posterior in the legal domain.
As a previous approach, Brewka [2] succeeded to compute dynamic preferences by logic programming which is based on the modied well-founded semantics for extended logic programs.
In this paper, we present a method of handling some class of dynamic preferences in the framework of circumscription. This enables us to compute consistently its metalevel and object-level reasoning by expressing them in an extended logic program, whose declarative meaning is given by the answer set semantics. In order to reason the priorities, we makes use of the policy axioms whose meaning is similar (but not equivalent) to Lifschitz's policy axioms [9] which permit to describe circumscription policy by axioms. By using our policy axioms, domain-independent inference rules from preferences to priorities are provided. Thus priorities can be derived from the preferences dynamically, which triggers to compute the object-level circumscriptive theory by logic programming based on Wakaki and Satoh's method [12] of compiling circumscription into extended logic programs.
Preliminaries
Terminology and notation used in this paper is briey shown. Let A(P; Z) be a sentence, P be a tuple of minimized predicates and Z be a tuple of variable predicates. Q denotes the rest of the predicates occurring in A, called the xed predicates. Then parallel circumscription of P in A(P; Z) with variable Z is denoted by Circum(A; P ; Z). If P is broken into the disjoint parts P 1 ; . . . ; P k , then the circumscription assigning a higher priority to the members of P i than to the members of P j for i < j is denoted by the following prioritized circumscription:
Circum(A; P 1 > P 2 > . . . > P k ; Z):
Prioritized circumscription can be represented by using parallel circumscription as follows:
Circum(A; P 1 > . . . > P k ; Z) V k i=1 Circum(A; P i ; P i+1 ; . . . ;P k ; Z)
A circumscriptive theory (A; C) [3] is another representation of circumscription where A is a sentence and C is a circumscription policy. For example, in prioritized circumscription, minimized predicates, variable predicates and xed predicates as well as priorities among predicates in P should be specied as the circumscription policy.
Lifschitz [9] showed that the circumscriptive policy can be described by the policy axioms. Let Introducing such policy axioms expressing priorities make the theory stronger monotonically.
Extended logic programs have the expressive power to represent classical negation (:) along with negation as failure (not) which enables us to represent incomplete information. A rule with variables stands for all its ground instances.
The declarative meaning of an extended logic program is given by the answer sets semantics [5] which is an extension of the stable model semantics [4] for a normal logic program.
Denition 2 Let 6 be a set of clauses. Then T h(6) stands for a set of clauses which are theorems of 6. A clause in T h(6) which is not properly subsumed by any theorem in T h(6) is called a characteristic clause. T h(6) denotes the set of all characteristic clauses in T h(6) [7] .
Wakaki and Satoh [12] proposed a method of compiling parallel circumscription and prioritized circumscription into extended logic programs ELP 5 and ELP 5 respectively. In the following Denition 3 and Denition 4, we restrict a sentence A to the one which is function-free and contains both the domain closure axiom (DCA) and uniqueness of names axioms (UNA where`i j 2 f`1; . . . ;`ng (for j = 1; . . . ; n). be transformed in such a way that all predicate symbols occurring in it are renamed by using P i 1 ; . . . ; P i k , Zi,Qi instead of P 1 ; . . . ; P k , Z,Q, which leads to as follows: Circum( 8 Ai; P i i ; P i i+1 ; . . . ;P i k ; Zi); For any predicate u from P; Z; Q and any t,
where u and u i stand for any predicate symbol of (P r ) f ; Z g ; Q h and any one of (P i r ) f ; (Zi) g ; (Qi) h respectively.
(1 f `r; 1 g m; 1 h n)
The main theorems of Wakaki and Satoh's method [12] are as follows:
Theorem 1 For any ground literal G of the language of A whose predicate symbol is not equality, it holds that, Circum( We consider the reasoning formalized by a circumscriptive theory (A; C) with a set M where A is a sentence represented by a set of clauses, C is the circumscription policy and M is a set of preference informations. We suppose that A and M are given as well as a tuple P of minimized predicates, a tuple Z of variable predicates and a tuple Q of xed predicates are already specied as the circumscription policy C, but priorities among predicates in P is unknown and is required to be determined based on the reasoning from preferences in M .
Meta level reasoning from preferences to priorities
In this paper, the similar notions, i.e. priorities and preferences are introduced. We use \priorities" as the priorities expressed in prioritized circumscription which formalizes the object-level reasoning. On the other hand, there exist many kinds of preferences which are not only between the objectlevel rules but also between the metalevel rules, i.e. metarules in the application domain. The preferences about the objectlevel rules can be easily corresponded to priorities in prioritized circumscription, but the correspondence between priorities and preferences about metarules is not clear though a human being does it based on his metalevel reasoning. In this section, rstly we show how to represent preferences in M and then model the human's metalevel reasoning from various preference information to priorities which is described by a normal logic program:5 [ 0 as follows.
Representation of Priorities
There are two ways to represent relative priorities between minimized predicates. One is the priority relation used to represent prioritized circumscription and another is Lifschitz's policy axiom [9] In this paper, we also use policy axioms V [p 1 : p 2 ] which have the above properties about minimized predicates (i.e. pre-order). Strictly speaking, however, our policy axioms are not equivalent to Lifschitz's policy axiom under the semantics of circumscription. The reason is that as the minimality condition for minimized predicates, we take into account either parallel circumscription or prioritized circumscription while he postulate the pointwise approach of circumscription based on his policy axioms. We only use the policy axiom in order to express the minimizing order among minimized predicates by a pre-order relation. If there exist both V [p 1 : p 2 ] and V [p 2 : p 1 ], we adopt such a circumscription policy that there is no priority between them and both p 1 and p 2 should be minimized in parallel.
Example 1
The circumscription policy in the regal example in section 1 is given as follows: P = fab1; ab2g; Z = fperfectedg; Q = fpossession; ship; :fin0statementg
The following policy axioms exist corresponding to all predicates in P .
Representation of Preferences
A human being does not consider the conict between preferences as a contradiction, but only consider there is no precedence between them, which does not mean contradiction. So, we represent the preference information by a pre-order explicitly though Brewka [1] expresses the preference by a strict partial order. We use a special (inx) symbol that can take rule names as arguments to represent preferences among rules and has a simple mathematical property, that is, pre-order (i.e., a reexive and transitive relation) on the class of all rule names.
Intuitively, n 1 n 2 where n 1 and n 2 are rule names means the rule with name n 2 is more or equally preferable to n 1 . In practical application, special preference informations are often referred by unique names, e.g. Lex Superior; Lex P osterior.
So, we introduce a 3-ary predicate symbol whose three arguments are rule names. (n 1 ; n 2 ; n 3 ) denotes that a preference information n 1 n 2 is derived due to a rule n 3 .
There exist sometimes both (n 1 ; n 2 ; n 3 ) and (n 2 ; n 1 ; n 4 ), or equivalently (n 1 n 2 )^(n 2 n 1 ): This means that there is no precedence between n 1 and n 2 (i.e. n 1 and n 2 have the equal preference each other) due to the conict between n 3 and n 4 .
Example 2
Preference Information of a legal example in section 1 can be represented by using our notation as follows:
Since the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is newer than the Ship Mortgage Act (SMA), the principle of Lex Posterior gives a following preference:
Since this Lex Posterior is named by a rule name LP (SMA; UCC), the above preference is expressed by (SMA; UCC; LP (SMA; UCC)):
where the rule name is explicitly represented along with the preference.
Inference from Preferences to Priorities
Inference from preferences to priorities are represented by a normal logic program as follows.
A policy axiom V [p1 : p2] is represented by a ground literal V (p1; p2) in which V is a predicate symbol and p1 and p2 are the individual constants corresponding to minimized predicates p1 and p2 of the object-level circumscription.
A priority relation is represented by a ground literal: p1 > p2 where > is a binary (inx) predicate symbol. When p1; p2 occur in dierent clauses (rules) r1; r2 of a set A of clauses respectively, assigning the higher priority to p1 than to p2 can be said in such other words that a rule r1 takes precedence over a rule r2. Therefore according to this 1-1 correspondence between an ordered pair of p1, p2 and an ordered pair of r1, r2, we allow the predicate > as well as V to have rule names as its arguments like r1 > r2 as well as V (r1; r2).
By allowing > as well as V to have rule names as its arguments, the precedence between meta-rules can also be expressed by using the predicate symbols > as well as V .
The correspondence between r1 > r2 and p1 > p2 intervenes between the metalevel and the object-level reasoning, which is described as follows: p1 > p2 r1 > r2:
(8p1 2 P; 8p2 2 P ) This is the domain-dependent information. where not denotes the negation-as-failure operator, T ran is a function symbol and dom is a unary predicate symbol. T ran(u; v) is a name of a rule (6). Every rule name r i should be described by a ground atom such as dom(r i ) in 0.
A rule (1) shows how to obtain the priority relation > between a rule x and a rule y which is a strict partial order from the policy axiom V (x; y) which is a pre-order. The rule (2) expresses a transitive relation as one of properties of policy axioms. V (x; x) expressing a reexive relation also holds, but it is omitted because it is redundant to nd out priorities. The rule (3) means that if there is a fact that a rule x is preferable to a rule y and there is no evidence to the contrary, then x takes the higher precedence or equal to y (or equivalently, a minimized predicate of x has the higher or equal priority than that of y). The rule (4) denotes that if there exist both x y and y x due to the conict of two meta rules z 1 and z 2 respectively , but z 2 is preferable to z 1 as well as there is no evidence to the contrary, then x takes the higher or equal precedence to y. A rule (5) gives a kind of the transitive relation about such that, if there exist both x y and y x due to the conict of meta rules z 1 and z 2 , a preference between x and y due to the meta-meta rule u is transitively derived from the corresponding preference between meta rules of z 1 and z 2 due to the meta-meta rule u. A rule (6) expresses a property of pre-order , i.e. a transitive relation. In the following, it is shown that metalevel reasoning from preferences to priorities presented in section 3.1 and the objectlevel circumscription can be integrated consistently based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, i.e. Wakaki and Satoh's method [12] . In prioritized circumscription:
Circum( 8 A; P 1 > P 2 > . . . > P k ; Z); a tuple P of n minimized predicates is broken into disjoint parts P 1 ; . . . ; P k with assigning a higher priority to the members of P i than to the members of P j for i < j where for any i (1 i k),
and P i j (1 j n i ) is a predicate constant from P . The special case of k = 1 corresponds to parallel circumscrip-tion: Circum( 8 A; P ; Z). Therefore every dierent division h P 1 ; . . . ; P k i of a given P can specify every corresponding prioritized circumscription including parallel circumscription. In the following denition, rstly a set of extended logic programs ELP 5 (or ELP 5 ) corresponding to all possible prioritized circumscription is generated according to the method in [12] and then conditions about priority relations are introduced to each rule in every generated ELP 5 (or ELP 5 ). 3. E is a union of all E( h P 1 ; . . . ; P k i ).
A set, P ri, dened in Denition 6 does not always form a division of a tuple P suitable for prioritized circumscription dened in Denition 7. However, if the set forms such a division, the following theorem holds. Lifschitz [9] proposed a method which allows us to formalize some forms of metalevel reasoning in the circumscriptive theory by using his policy axioms. In his formalism, when both V [ab1 : ab2] and V [ab2 : ab1] as the policy axioms exist, there is possibility that the circumscriptive theory becomes inconsistent due to the minimality condition (p.139 in [10] ). We do not consider such a case as contradiction, but would like to consider that there is no priority between ab1 and ab2 since Lifschitz's policy axiom represents a pre-order relation of the priority. In our method, the circumscriptive theory does not become inconsistent under the existence of such policy axioms since ab1 and ab2 are minimized in parallel. Brewka [2] succeeded to compute the reasoning with dynamic preferences by logic programming. His method can be regarded as giving the model-theoretical formulation to the approach presented by Prakken and Sartor [11] . His approach is achieved by using a prioritized logic program(PLP) proposed by him as well as the semi-normal default theory. PLP can describe preferences between rules expressed by extended logic programs and its time complexity is polynomial since the declarative meaning is given by an extended well-founded semantics. However our method is more protable for the purpose of the legal reasoning since more useful informations of the application domain can be obtained by stable semantics and answer set semantics than the well-founded one.
For example, in the regal reasoning, preferences and priorities among rules as well as metarules are often required for attorney-at-law to nd out in order to derive a desired conclusion which gives him the advantage in the argumentation of court. Since our approach is especially based on the stable models as well as answer sets which are not always unique like a well-founded model, we can nd out such not-unique candidate preferences or priorities as explanations in abduction from the stable models or answer sets, each of which leads to derive a desired conclusion. Thus there is such a merit in our approach that the attorney can either choose the most adequate preference or priority for him or obtains some or all of the candidate ones depending on his needs and situation. Our research about nding preferences and priorities will be reported in our subsequent paper.
Besides as far as adequate preferences are given, the reasoning with dynamic preferences can be formalized by prioritized circumscription or parallel circumscription and can be computed by our approach. On the other hand, sometimes reasonable conclusions are not obtained by using his method since its semantics inherits some drawbacks of the well-founded semantics which is addressed in Brewka's paper [2] .
Regarding Prakken and Sartor's approach, their method is procedural though our approach as well as Brewka's one are based on a model theoretic semantics. We think that the model theoretic approach is important in a sense that, it is easier for the model theoretic approach than the procedural approach to examine and verify various properties of the reasoning about dynamic preferences since the model theoretic approach has the mathematical foundation and is more abstract than the procedural one. 5 Conclusion
The crucial characteristics of the legal reasoning regarded as the commonsense reasoning is that it inevitably requires the metalevel reasoning about preferences among laws like Lex Superior, etc. along with the object-level legal reasoning, that is, the needs of reasoning to handle dynamic preferences correctly.
When we formalize such a reasoning by means of circumscription, the metalevel reasoning of preferences among laws leads to determine the circumscription policy, i.e. priorities among the abnormal predicates of circumscription in the object-level reasoning. The framework of circumscription, however, obliges us to pre-specify the circumscription policy. Thus, there is no way to reason its circumscription policy itself as well as no way to intervene between the metalevel reasoning of the circumscription policy and the non-monotonic reasoning of the object domain based on the circumscription policy derived in the metalevel.
In this paper, we propose an approach which overcomes such diculties. Our approach enables us to handle some class of dynamic preferences in the framework of circumscription and compute it by logic programming based on Wakaki and Satoh's method [12] .
When priority relations obtained in the metalevel reasoning do not have correspondence to a division of minimized predicates given in Denition 7, our method shown in Theorem 3 does not become applicable. However this does not always mean the limitation of our method. This is because depending on the lack of preferences or the information structures of preferences, various priority orderings among minimized predicates each of which does not correspond to parallel circumscription or prioritized circumscription, may be derived in the metalevel reasoning. For example, such a case may be obtained in the metalevel reasoning that there exist many disjoint subsets of minimized predicates where each subset has some priority ordering among its predicates, but there are no ordering among those subsets. How to formalize such cases by extending the framework of circumscription is our future 
